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ABSTRACT
Democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia is dynamic, especially in terms of electoral politics. 
Some scholars assume that politik aliran (political streams) is still continued, but others 
believe it has ended. In this article, we examine the dynamic of politik aliran in the 1999, 
2004 and 2009 general elections. It is widely recognised that the votes of both Nationalist 
and Islam political parties declined from election to election. This study aims to analyse 
the continuity and change both of Nationalist and Islamic parties in Indonesia. The results 
of the study suggest that electoral politics based on politik aliran in post-Suharto Indonesia 
continues, but the number of votes for neither Islamic nor for Nationalist parties have 
changed. The balance of power between Islamic parties and Nationalists parties is expected 
to change.
Keywords: Indonesia, Islam, nationalist, party, politik aliran, volatility 
INTRODUCTION
Politik aliran (political streams) in Indonesia 
refers to political cleavages. Its implicit 
meaning carries a note of socio-religiosity or 
santri-abangan-priyayi, a form of political 
institution such as Islamic and Nationalist 
political parties. From the first democratic 
elections held in 1955 until the elections of 
1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 under 
a repressive New Order regime, scientists 
considered that politik aliran was the 
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determinant factor that affected political 
behaviour (Aminuddin, 2016; Naharuddin, 
2016; Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016). Politik 
aliran also continued in post-Suharto 
Indonesia ( Baswedan, 2004a, King, 2003, 
2004b, Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016). 
According to King (2003), in some 
regions, the number of votes for parties in 
the 1999 election was similar to that in 1955 
when the election was marked by politik 
aliran. Using King’s method, Baswedan 
compared the 1999 and 2004 elections in 
terms of the pattern of voter support and 
found a significant number of votes for 
Islamic parties in every town and district, 
with a majority of Moslem, Nationalist 
and Christian parties getting strong support 
from PDI -P  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle) supporters (Baswedan, 2004b). In 
the 2009 election, however, voter loyalty to 
these parties dwindled (Nurjaman, 2017). 
Saiful Mujani (2007); William Liddle; 
Wawan Sobari (2016) argued against 
this, stating that the influence of religious 
orientation on the vote for Islamic parties in 
the post-Suharto election was not significant. 
Wawan Sobari stated, “The Javanese phrase 
‘anut grubyuk’ was mentioned by voters 
as one of the reasons for voting the way 
they did” (Wawan Sobari, 2016, p. 249). 
On their part, Liddle and Mujani found 
that leadership was a significant factor 
in political behaviour as a consequence 
of the development of the mass media, 
especially television, in rural areas (Mujani 
& Liddle, 2010). Another study also found 
that “Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) has the highest impact 
as the best option during the campaign and 
more effective and improve  monitoring of 
the progress of the party” (Yaacob, Ambong, 
Endut, & Amin, 2014, p. 1). Nevertheless, 
we  assume that politik aliran still exists , 
although there have been changes from one 
election to the next.
In this article, I seek to examine the 
votes  for both Nationalist and Islamic 
block parties at the national level. A study 
of block parties in the electoral arena is 
very important for several reasons: first, the 
dynamic of electoral politics will affect the 
issues of the electoral campaign; second, 
a change in the number of votes within 
block parties will affect policy outcomes in 
parliament; third, such a change will affect 
the party coalition and the party in power. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Democracy and Political Party
Political parties play an important role 
in a modern democracy (representative 
democracy). Scholars have repeatedly 
stressed the importance of political parties 
and see it as the main criterion for measuring 
democracy, especially in transition because 
“during the transition and over subsequent 
electoral periods, political parties have 
emerged in these democracies to select 
candidates, mobilize constituents, contest 
elections, and form governing coalitions” 
(Lupu, 2013, p. 1340). However, nations 
with a long tradition of democracy will 
remain stable, as, according to Wittenberg 
(2013), “these countries and the voters 
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living there accumulate experience with 
democracy and a democratic party system, 
however, levels of volatility are expected to 
decrease” (Wittenberg, 2013, p. 22). 
Political parties also provide issues 
and a choice of leadership for the public, 
which they promise will be implemented 
when they come to power. Schattsneider 
stated that it is clear that political parties 
create democracy, and modern democracy 
is unthinkable without the existence of 
political parties (Saglie & Heidar, 2004, 
p.1). However, Veenendaal (2016) has 
challenged this argument, stating: 
. . . the Schattschneider thesis may 
hence be empirically incorrect, from 
a more normative perspective the idea 
that parties fulfill a crucial role in a 
representative democracy seems to be at 
least partially confirmed by the present 
analysis of Palau. In the case of Palau, 
the absence of parties is strongly related 
to the significance of clan relations and 
personalistic politics, and as several 
respondents indicated these alternatives 
to political parties have a largely 
negative impact on Palauan politics. 
(Veenendaal, 2016, p. 8)
Regarding the transition from oligarchic 
to democratic societies, Acemoglu (2004) 
offered a different argument i.e.
. . . in a certain moment in time 
an ol igarchic regime may have 
a comparative advantage over a 
democratic one in terms of  the 
preservation of property rights, thanks 
to its greater capacity and incentives to 
set lower tax rates on the elite’s wealth. 
(Mejía & Posada, 2007, p. 7) 
This argues that the previous regime 
prepares for a further step of democracy, 
particularly democratic transition into the 
second phase of consolidation of democracy. 
Briefly, when a democratic regime and 
the effective functioning of democratic 
institutions have been established and have 
legitimacy, then the format and function of 
the party system become very important.
. . . almost 30 years ago, ‘the stability 
of the party system [rather than the 
parties] was the really decisive factor 
for the stability of the whole system 
in all democratic systems. . . .its 
findings have important implications 
in terms of how democracy should be 
promoted. . . should be approached 
with a preferential eye on party systems 
rather than merely on parties, as has 
usually been the . . . focusing on party 
systems must remain a basic if not the 
central theme for examining the survival 
of liberal democracy. (Casal Bértoa, 
2016, p. 20)
 This means that the stabilisation of the 
party and the party system is very important 
for the government. The stabilisation of the 
party and party system is correlated with 
the stabilisation of political cleavage; the 
cleavage determines political behaviour or 
‘the frozen cleavages ’. Similar to the last 
pint  is “the basic cleavages that undergird 
party support over the medium or long 
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term: the national revolution that produced 
a cleavage between the central state and 
peripheral communities and between the 
central state and a supranational church; 
and the industrial revolution that produced 
an urban/rural cleavage, and later a worker/
employer cleavage” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2017, p. 3).
Regarding “the frozen cleavages”, 
many researchers have to accept the fact 
that the cleavage  not frozen anymore due 
to decreasing alignment and increasing 
individual emancipation. A general process 
of de-alignment occurs across time, indicated 
by the decreasing association between 
political preferences on the one hand and 
class, religion and regime preferences on 
the other. Regarding how religious cleavage 
works in shaping political behaviour, 
Bargsted wrote: 
The level of religiosity – as indicated 
by the intensity of religious feelings, 
beliefs, or behaviors – can also shape 
political preferences. . . . found that 
after extensive statistical controls more 
frequent worship is associated with 
right ideological self-placement and 
that the effect was stronger than that 
of class. Church attendance, the most 
commonly used indicator of religiosity, 
is often seen as a strong determinant of 
rightist positions . . . . (Bargsted, 2012, 
p. 6)
In  addi t ion ,  the  impact  o f  the 
emancipation of individual voters over 
time has meant that people no longer vote 
for the party of their social group. In order 
to respond to these circumstances, political 
parties began to look for other social 
groups and tried not to focus solely on their 
social affiliations. Some Islamic parties 
used the issue of poverty or low income 
to politicise Islam (Choi, 2017). Political 
issues became a more determinant effect 
as a base of their choice in the election, as 
various scholars pointed out that the decline 
in voting structure went hand in hand with 
the growing issue of voting. Furthermore, 
“Strengthening of ethnic tolerance among 
the youth involves educating them on the 
cultural differences and issues of interethnic 
relations through the mainstream news 
media” (Tamam et al., 2008, p. 1).
Political Cleavage in Indonesia
Many scholars have shown that religious 
cleavage is the most significant factor in 
studying electoral politics. Trihartono and 
Patriadi (2016) pointed out the importance of 
religious cleavage, especially Indonesians’ 
electoral politics. “Social cleavages are 
widely assumed to have a close link with 
the party system. In a plural society like 
Indonesia, in which primordial sentiments 
frequently emerge, the cleavages do not 
only draw upon different social groups, 
.., its election and party system have been 
frequently analyzed through cleavages 
framework” (Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016, 
p. 26). Conventional wisdom regarding 
the effect of social cleavages maintains 
that greater social cleavage diversity leads 
to greater party system fragmentation 
(Raymond, Huelshoff, & Rosenblum, 2016, 
p. 2).
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Cleavage theory, originated by Lipset 
and Rokkan, conceives a national party 
system as the expression of underlying 
social conflicts (Hooghe & Marks, 2017, p. 
3). Cleavages can be derived from economic 
class, religion, ethnicity, language, culture 
and geography, among others. But the 
determinant cleavage comes from religion, 
as Knutsen (2012) pointed out: “Some 
important political value orientations can 
be derived from the structural cleavages 
incorporated in the well-known model of 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The religious 
cleavage is related to religious versus 
more secular values” (Knutsen, 2012, p. 
4). However, religious leaders in diverse 
societies competing along a dominant versus 
minority religious cleavage often seek to 
incorporate overlapping ethnic and/or class 
issues into their struggles (Raymond, 2016, 
p. 6).
Just as other countries have frozen 
cleavage  based on religion, Indonesia too 
has a basic cleavage based on religious 
behaviour, namely political streaming or 
politik aliran in Indonesian.  Politik aliran 
is a generic term used to refer to the term 
political cleavages, even though it may 
be somewhat less precise. In the absence 
of an equivalent term, politik aliran is 
used to give meaning to the term political 
cleavages. It was suggested as a political 
concept by Clifford Geertz (Trihartono & 
Patriadi, 2016, p. 3) and despite garnering 
some amount of criticism, it continues to 
be a major tool in the study of Indonesian 
politics. 
The pattern of politik aliran gives 
implicit meaning to the socio-religious 
term, santri-abangan-priyayi, a type of 
political institution such as Islamic or 
Nationalist parties. “Those distinctions 
have been carefully elaborated in Indonesia, 
most famously with Clifford Geertz’s 
differentiation of abangan (traditional, less 
orthodox) and santri (modernist and more 
pious, generally divided into urban and rural 
variants) sociopolitical aliran (streams)” 
(Weis, 2010, p. 84). “The Religion of 
Java”, the seminal book by Geertz (1959) 
continues to be cited up to today in social 
discourse, politics and culture in Indonesia, 
providing the main reference for scientists 
for understanding Java. 
Briefly, santri is a devout Moslem group 
that seeks to ensure that Islam is the basis 
or foundation for political groupings, such 
as political parties and the state. Therefore, 
Islamic political parties were formed, and 
in the 1950s it was attempted to govern 
Indonesia based on Islam . On the other 
hand, abangan is a nominal Moslem group 
who believe that Islam is not important in 
socio-political life. Thus, it should come as 
no surprise if abangan eventually become 
more open to other dominant political 
ideology such as communism. The third 
group, priyayi, is a Moslem group who 
are culturally close to abangan; what sets 
them apart is the way they behave, which is 
more refined. In addition, many of them are 
government officials.
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METHODS
The aim of this study was to gain greater 
insight into the nature of politik aliran 
(political streams) by exploring a secondary 
set of electoral data. To examine the viability 
of the arguments that have been derived 
from the theory, this study conducted a 
qualitative analysis of party votes for both 
Islamic and Nationalist parties in Indonesia 
after the fall of Suharto in 1998 and its 
effects on the dynamic of politik aliran 
(political streams) in the following period.
To fulfil data collection requirements, 
the research used secondary data. The 
main databank was obtained from the 
Indonesian National Electoral Commission 
(KPU) and others sources such as books, 
documents and journals. Data that needed 
to be calculated were the Nationalist block 
party votes, Islamic block party votes and 
the volatility of the party block votes. 
Data on the secondary electoral results of 
the national election  were collected from 
the Internet website, www.kpu.go.id. A 
qualitative method of analysis was used to 
assess whether political cleavage factors 
(Islamic vs Nationalist) related to the 
election result can explain differences in 
the volatility of block votes for the parties 
in each Indonesian election.  
Although this study will not provide 
a conclusive answer to the question of 
whether the strength of cleavage inhibited 
or aggravated electoral volatility, the 
analysis will hopefully provide useful 
insights into how different features of party 
ideology affect the dynamics of politik 
aliran (political streams). The in-depth 
studies  will be written about the Islamic 
block party (Modernist and Traditionalist), 
analyzing the volatility of votes that induced 
a change in politik aliran (political streams) 
and traditionalist parties, which continue 
politik aliran (political streams) today 
despite the decrease in their votes. Electoral 
results of both modernist and traditionalist 
Islamic parties have been relatively well-
documented. 
RESULTS
Politik aliran in post-Suharto Indonesia 
persists even though some of its dynamics 
correlate with the volatility of the votes for 
the parties from one election to the next. The 
results of the 1999 election were congruent 
with that of the 1955 election due to the 
fact that many of the parties in the 1950s 
were both Nationalist and Islamic parties. 
In 1999, there were more votes for the 
Nationalist block than for the Islamic block, 
but in 2004, there was a slight change, and 
the votes for the Nationalist block decreased 
somewhat. In 2009, the votes for the Islamic 
block decreased significantly (10.83%) 
(Table 1).  
Continuity of Politik Aliran: Total 
Vote of Nationalist Parties and Islamic 
Parties Persist
The first national election in 1955 resulted 
in a party system structured by aliran (Ufen, 
2006, p. 28) and this trend continued in 
the post-Suharto Indonesia elections. The 
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, PAN) and the National Awakening 
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) 
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for example, had strong affinity with two 
parties from the 1950s, the Masyumi and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). PPP (Persatuan 
Pembangunan, United Development Party), 
and Golkar are state-sponsored products of 
the New Order regime, while the Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
PKS)  is “the prominent new political 
trend in the mid-2000s in urban Indonesia” 
(Okamoto, 2014, p. 9), emerging out of a 
campus-based religious movement.
Most of the parties in post-Suharto 
Indonesia, in both the Nationalist and 
Islamic block, were a continuation 
of the 1955 election. However, in the 
1999 election, most of the voters chose 
Nationalist parties such as Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, Indonesian 
Democratic Party-Struggle) and Golongan 
Karya (Golkar, The Functional Group of 
Parties). PDIP was the majority winner with 
35,689,073 votes (33.74%), while, Golkar 
as a party ruler in the time of the New Order 
government, was the second plurality winner 
after PDI, with 22.44%. The hegemonic 
party, Golkar, lived on after the fall of the 
Suharto regime although the numbers were 
volatile, at 22.4% in 1999, 21.58% in 2004 
and 14.45% in 2009. However, during the 
New Order period, Golkar always gained the 
average vote of more than 60%.
On the other hand, the number of votes 
for the Islamic block parties in post-Suharto 
Indonesia was relatively the same, although 
the share of the votes among the Islamic 
parties in the block changed from one 
election to the next. Moreover, although 
Indonesia has a majority Moslem (80%) 
population (Baswedan, 2004a p. 1; Buehler, 
2009, p. 1), the share of the votes for the 
Islamic block parties was not significant. 
In 1999, the vote shares for the Islam block 
parties was 38.10%, and this increased to 
2.22% in 2004. Nevertheless, the increasing 
votes for the Islamic block parties, from 
38.10% (1999) to 40.32% (2004) was short-
lived as in the next election, the number of 
votes for the Islam block parties dropped 
dramatically from 40.32 % to 29.49%. With 
that, the Islamic block parties lost about 
10.83% of the vote in 2009 (Table 1). In 
comparison, in the 1955 election, Masjumi 
and NU as the Islamic parties of the era, 
obtained approximately 43.70% of the votes 
(Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016, p. 30). 
Although the votes for the Islamic 
parties fluctuated, most the parties, such 
as Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United 
Development Party), Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperity 
and Justice Party) and Partai Amanat 
Table 1 
Comparison of the number of votes obtained by the Nationalist vs the Islamic blocks of parties
Votes (%)
1955 1999 2004 Change 2009 Change
Islamic
Nationalist
43.70 38.10 40.32 + 2.22 29.49 - 10.83
56.3 61.90 59.68 - 2.22 70.51 + 10.83
Source: Research Findings
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Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) 
endured the shifting political climate.
 In 1999, PPP had listed the principles 
of Islam as its party ideology. This party 
survived from the New Order era party, 
which was originally a consolidation of 
some of the parties based on religion. Since 
the PPP was the result of this merger, the 
elite of PPP were a combination of modernist 
and traditionalist leaders. Meanwhile, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperity and 
Justice Party) had attracted much attention 
due to its spectacular increase in the number 
of votes in 2004. The former name of the 
party was Justice Party (PK, 1999), but 
the name had to be changed due to a low 
electoral threshold of 2.5%. At the time, the 
party received only 1.7% of the votes, but 
this number increased four-fold to 7.3% in 
the next election in 2004, and then increased 
again slightly in 2009 to stand at 7.9%. The 
party was led by a cadre of passionate and 
highly educated leaders of Islamic student 
organisations. PKS successfully utilised 
organisation and campaign techniques 
introduced by Western democracies. 
This encouraged other Islamic parties to 
undertake similar efforts to revamp to more 
modern campaign strategies. 
Ano the r  I s l amic  pa r ty,  Par ta i 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National 
Awakening Party), was a revamp of 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Islamic 
mass organisation in Indonesia, and was 
proposed by Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur). 
It was one of the Islamic parties that drew 
strength and support from the constituencies; 
however, this party lacked organisation and 
succumbed to many internal conflict among 
its elites. In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 general 
elections, PKB’s number of votes was, 
respectively 7.12%, 6.47% and 6.01%. It 
would be no exaggeration to assert that 
PKB and NU were the same party as Gus 
Dur, the founder of PKB, was also a central 
figure in NU. 
Changes to Politik Aliran: The Volatility 
of Islamic Block Party Votes
Parties such as PBB, PKS and PAN were 
classified as modernist Islamic parties. 
On the other hand, PKB, PNU, PNUI and 
PKNU were classified as traditionalist 
Islamic parties. Islamic parties in post-
Suharto Indonesia had no stable electoral 
performance due to reforms to the electoral 
system and the emergence of new parties. 
Núñez, Simón and Pilet pointed out 
that “volatility does indeed increase the 
likelihood of reforming the electoral system 
but only when volatility due to new parties 
is considered” (Núñez, Simón, & Pilet, 
2017, p. 15).
Moreover,  in  the  pos t -Suhar to 
election, modernist Islamic parties showed 
an increasing trend in their electoral 
performance compared to the traditionalist 
parties. However, the total number of 
Islamic parties, whether modernist or 
traditionalist, from one election to the next 
was slightly equal. The number of votes for 
the traditional Islamic parties (minus PPP) in 
the 1999, 2004 and 2009 general elections, 
respectively, were 14.35%, 14.59% and 
7.95% (Table 2). The number of votes for 
PPP itself, respectively was 10.71%, 8.16% 
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DISCUSSION
In countries that have advanced in the 
process of democracy, inter-party rivalry 
originates from the split between left 
and right ideology. However, inter-party 
rivalry in Indonesia is not rooted in socio-
economics as is true for Western Europe 
and other developed countries. Block 
parties in Indonesia are anchored in political 
streams (politik aliran), that is, they are 
catagoried along two poles, santri and 
abangan (Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016). 
Santri parties lean towards Islam in their 
politics, while abangan parties tend to be 
Nationalist parties.  
In the context of the 1999 election, 
which was clearly different in trend, 
according to Weis (2010) politik aliran 
“could not really manifest itself in the 
more urban, mobile, educated society of 
1999, patterns of mobilisation still tended 
to emphasize loyalties either to modernist 
Islam or to a traditionalist-nationalist 
alliance” (Weis, 2010, p. 89). The first 
election in post-Suharto Indonesia, in 
1999, voted in the nationalist block parties, 
with 61.90% of the votes going to them, 
while the Islamic block parties garnered 
only 38.10% of the total votes. Some of 
the Islamic parties, such as PPP and PKS 
Table 2
Comparison vote of modernist Vs traditionalist Islam parties in 1999, 2004 and 2009 general elections 
1999 Election Year 2004 Election Year 2009 Election Year
Islamic Parties Party Name
Vote 
(%)
Total 
Vote 
(%)
Party
Name
Vote 
(%)
Total 
Vote 
(%)
Party 
Name
Vote 
(%)
Total 
Vote 
(%)
Modernist PBB 1.94 PBB 2.56 PBB 1.79
Islamic PK 1.36 PKS 7.20 PKS 7.88
Parties PAN 7.12 PAN 6.47 PAN 6.01
PDR 0.40 P. Merdeka 0.74
Others 1.60 12.42 Other 0.60 17.57 Other 0.54 16.22
Traditionalist  PKB 12.61 PKB 11.98 PKB 4.94
Islamic PNU 0.64 PNUI 0.79 PKNU 1.47
Parties Other 1.10 14.35 Other 3.19 14.59 Other 1.54 7.95
PPP 10.71 PPP* 8.16 PPP 5.32
Others 0.62 11.33 Other 8.16 Other 5.32
Total Islam 38.10 40.32 29.49
Source: Research Findings
and 5.32%. In this article, PPP is classified 
as a traditionalist Islamic party, since many 
modernist Islamic voters swung their vote 
to the modernist party, PAN. 
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tried to respond to the electoral condition 
by promoting stronger Islamic ideology 
and succeeded in improving their electoral 
performance in the 2004 election, increasing 
the number of votes they received by 2.22%. 
It is clear that politik aliran works for the 
Indonesian electoral system as a frozen 
cleavage (Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016). In 
order to determine whether or not there is 
a correlation between the increase in the 
votes received by the Islam block parties 
and the ideology they promoted still needs 
to be proven. 
However, in 2004, the Islamic block 
parties decreased significantly from 40.32% 
to 29.49% as voters were extremely 
disappointed fin them. According to 
Naharuddin (2016), Ufen mentioned that 
its significance began to diminish and 
referred to the de-alignment trend indicated 
by the rise of ‘presidentialised’ parties and 
growing intra-party authoritarianism. In 
addition, in the internal party, especially 
Islamic Traditionalist parties, there was 
often conflict among the elite in addition 
to political patronage and corruption: “the 
party was fragmented organizationally and 
susceptible to exogenous intrusions such as 
access to state patronage, corruption and 
electoral changes” (Kikue, 2011, p. 141). 
The decrease in the number of votes for 
the Islamic block parties was one of the 
explanations from some scholars given in 
claiming the end of politik aliran (Liddle 
& Saiful Mujani, 2007; Wawan Sobari, 
2016). However, it should be remembered 
that although the number of votes for the 
Islamic block parties decreased, some 
Islamic parties such as PKB, PAN, PPP and 
PKS have survived to this day.
 The weakening of politik aliran 
(political streams) has led to changes in 
the power among political parties, and this 
needs further explanation due to cause-and-
effect dynamic of the party system. The 
decline in voter alignment in post-Suharto 
Indonesia also needs further explanation, 
whether it is describing the symptom of 
the electoral market in the election or not. 
Changes in the electoral market can be 
seen from things such as changes in social 
structure, structural de-alignment and any 
decline in party identification, change in 
value orientation, competition issues and 
party crises. Furthermore, since electoral 
volatility is mostly due to higher voter 
distrust in the party, it appears as pragmatic 
behaviour in society and is welcomed by 
the party as pragmatism in the form of vote-
buying. High-cost politics was used as a 
bridge to reach voters outside the traditional 
base as a characteristic of the catch-all party. 
The catch-all party indulging in high-cost 
politics eventually took on cartel-party 
characteristics, and had an impact on the 
number of corruption cases involving 
members of the Representative Board.
CONCLUSION
Politik aliran (political streams) in post-
Suharto Indonesia was continued, but with 
some changes. The changes in politik aliran 
correlated with the volatility of individual 
parties, and this in turn contributed to the 
volatility of the block of parties. Some 
parties, neither Nationalist nor Islamic, lost 
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votes in subsequent elections. Volatility 
mostly came from the major parties such as 
PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat (Nationalist), PPP, 
PKB, PAN and PKS. Among the Islamic 
block of parties, both Modernist parties 
and Traditionalist parties experienced 
volatility, but the Traditionalists saw higher 
volatility than the Modernists, especially in 
2009. Parties that have survived from 1999 
to the present time can be categorised as 
nstitutionalised parties, meaning that they 
have roots in the community. 
The changes to politik aliran correlate 
with the fluctuation in the party votes 
from one election to the next, and this 
consequently changed the balance of 
block parties between the Islamic and 
Nationalist blocks. Even though the electoral 
performance of Islamic block parties is 
going to decline politik aliran has not ended. 
Some Islamic parties still exist, although 
the number of votes they receive is not 
significant. Nevertheless, they can survive. 
However, the strength of politik aliran 
in structuring political behaviour in post-
Suharto Indonesia has tended to decline. 
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